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**Office Memorandum**

• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates

SUBJECT: Coverage of International Communism

REFERENCE: Interim Report of the Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Committee  
Project dated 7 December 1948.

DATE: JAN 25 1949

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1. There is transmitted herewith the interim report of the Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Committee, set up on ORE initiative to make recommendations concerning the intelligence coverage of the international Communist movement. The report states inter alia that (a) there is not at present complete intelligence coverage of the international Communist movement in any U. S. Government agency; (b) there is no clear-cut delineation of responsibility for the production of intelligence on international Communism among the several Government intelligence agencies; and (c) there is insufficient coordination and contact on the working level between Government intelligence agencies dealing with Communism. The report requests that the various agencies concur in the findings and recommendations and recommends that the intelligence agencies undertake a coordinated program of intelligence research on the Communist movement, and that, as a necessary preliminary, the agencies come to an agreement as to the specific fields of intelligence concerning the Communist movement in which they are willing to assume primary responsibility.

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3. It is planned that the ORE Intelligence Production Board (augmented by representatives of OIR, FBI, OSO, and the International Communism Group, ORE, and other IAC Agencies whenever matters pertaining to their interests are under consideration) will function in an advisory capacity to the Assistant Director, ORE.

A copy of the detailed plan for the International Communism Group is attached.

4. It is planned that ORE will act as coordinator for the recommended research program on the subject of international Communism. ORE will assume

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? primary responsibility for the production of all national intelligence concerning international Communism. Insofar as this category overlaps with the political, sociological, and cultural aspects of the Communist movement, it will coordinate its production with that of OIR/State Department in order to avoid duplication. It is presumed that the armed forces will desire to retain primary responsibility for the production of intelligence relating to certain aspects of Communism, but it is not believed likely that there will be any serious clash of interests in those fields.

5. In order that the question of a detailed delineation of responsibility for research on specific aspects of international Communism may be settled, it is recommended that (a) the Director convene a joint meeting of the IAC Standing Committee and the [redacted] to prepare a delineation agreement for consideration by the IAC. (A draft of a proposed letter to the IAC agencies is attached); (b) the ORE plan for handling the CIA responsibilities concerning international Communism be approved; (c) the Director address a letter to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, substantially in accordance with the attached draft. It is believed that FBI advice and cooperation in the study of Communism will be of considerable assistance to the IAC research program.

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[redacted]  
THEODORE BABBITT

Attachments (4)

- (a) Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Committee [redacted] Interim Report.
- (b) Plan for Intelligence Treatment of International Communism by CIA.
- (c) Memorandum for Members of the IAC.
- (d) Letter to Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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MORI/CDF Pages 4-12, 14-15

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES  
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7 December 1948

INTERDEPARTMENTAL AD HOC COMMITTEE,  
INTERIM REPORT

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I PROBLEM

1. By directive of the Assistant Director, ORE, dated 17 June 1948, the Committee was established and assigned the following missions:

- (a) To ascertain what coverage should be given by the governmental intelligence organizations to Communist activities in various areas of the world;
- (b) To translate the coverage decided upon into a definite reporting program;
- (c) To draw up a priority listing of desired reports;
- (d) To make appropriate recommendations to the Assistant Director, R & E (Estimates Group) for scheduling reports in (c) above, taking into consideration the capacity of departmental intelligence organizations and ORE to produce the requisite reports.

2. The Committee first devoted its attention to 1(a) above and, after exploring this subject at some length, concluded that it would be impractical to pursue 1(b), 1(c) and 1(d) without some clarification of the responsibilities as between the various agencies represented.

3. In view of this, the Committee has decided to prepare this interim report in order to present its conclusions and recommendations regarding paragraph 1(a) above, and to request clarification of the responsibilities of the various agencies before turning to the problems in paragraphs 1(b), 1(c) and 1(d).

II CONCLUSIONS

The Committee's investigation of the problems set out in paragraph 1(a) has led to the following conclusions:

1. Adequate intelligence treatment requires that Communism be handled on a three-fold basis:

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(a) As an international political force based on a well defined doctrine with specific objectives employing a variety of techniques and engaged in political, psychological, economic, and subversive warfare against the non-Communist world in general and the United States in particular.

(b) As an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

(c) As a vital factor in the local political scene in various countries and regions.

2. Adequate intelligence coverage requires that the subject of Communism be treated under the following headings:

- (a) Doctrine
- (b) Organization
- (c) Strategy
- (d) Operational Methods
- (e) Personalities
- (f) Capabilities
- (g) Vulnerabilities

3. Such complete intelligence coverage does not now exist in any U. S. Government agency.

4. There is at present no clear-cut delineation of responsibility for the production of intelligence on International Communism among the several Government intelligence agencies.

5. There is insufficient coordination and contact on the working level between Government intelligence agencies dealing with Communism.

**(A) RECOMMENDATIONS**

In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that:

1. The intelligence agencies undertake a comprehensive and intensive program of intelligence research designed to provide the policy-makers with

- (a) a balanced analysis of the major features of International Communism as outlined in Part IV, paragraph 2, above, and (b) advance warning of new trends and developments in Communist operations.

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2. The next task of this or a similar interdepartmental committee dealing with this problem should be the precise delineation of the responsibilities for the production of intelligence on International Communism among the several Government intelligence agencies. Since the primary interests of the defense agencies are generally limited to the military aspect of the Communist movement, it is suggested that the responsibilities of the defense agencies be established first and that after this is done, OIR and ORE develop a coordinated program for the production of the remaining categories of intelligence concerning the Communist movement.

3. After the steps outlined in paragraph 2, above, have been completed, this Committee or a similar interdepartmental committee proceed to set up a definite reporting program and undertake the assignment of priorities for various reports in accordance with the original directive referred to in Part I, paragraph 1, above.

4. A permanent liaison committee be set up for the purpose of improving working-level contact among the several agencies.

5. Copies of this report be forwarded to the Directors of the several intelligence agencies, and that they be requested to (a) concur in the report, and (b) instruct their representatives on the Committee as to the specific fields of intelligence in which their agencies are willing to assume primary responsibility, and the fields in which their agencies desire to obtain finished intelligence from other agencies.

#### IV DISCUSSION

The discussion is contained in the Annex.

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CIA Representative

Carroll J. Hawkins  
Department of State Representative

Edward Fenimore  
Navy Department Representative

W. E. Chandler, Lt. Col., CSC  
Department of the Army Representative

Fred W. Seibert, Lt. Col., USAF  
Department of the Air Force  
Representative

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PUBLICATION

**Part 1 - INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM CALLED FOR IN  
THE INTEREST OF UNITED STATES SECURITY**

**A - International Aspects of Communism**

In its drive towards world domination, the International Communist movement directly threatens the security of the United States. American policy makers require adequate and continued information and analysis to be able to deal effectively with this challenge. The intelligence agencies must undertake, therefore, a comprehensive and intensive program of intelligence and research designed to answer this need by providing: (1) a balanced understanding of the major features of the Communist strategy, tactics, and capabilities on the international and national level; (2) an analysis of the vulnerability of the Communist system of operation and organization; and (3) the anticipation of new trends and developments in the operations of the Communist movement.

In accomplishing these tasks, the intelligence agencies face a unique problem inherent in the nature of the Communist movement. Communism is an organized international political force, based on a well defined doctrine, with specific objectives, which utilizes a bewildering variety of techniques to achieve its ends. Inseparably connected is the central role played by the Soviet Union and its foreign policy in pursuit of its own national interests. In addition, there are the regional and national Communist organizations which, within their own areas, may be capable of decisively influencing the social, political and economic organizations of society and in some cases capable of holding or achieving state power. These three institutions of International Communism have specific features unique to themselves which mutually influence and support one another. However, they may at times have conflicting interests which require concessions within the framework of the common organization and objectives. In some cases, these differences cannot be reconciled and they lead to splits and ruptures. It is precisely this interrelated and complex character of the Communist movement which imposes upon the American intelligence agencies the formulation of a program of study from an international and national point of view directed towards consideration of Communist doctrine, organizations, strategy, operational methods, personalities, capabilities and vulnerabilities.

(1) Doctrine - International Communism has evolved a well-defined series of concepts to serve as an integrated central hypothesis by which the movement lives. These all-embracing concepts comprise a philosophy, a theory of history based on the existence of class struggle and leading to Communist goals through a series of denoted stages, and specific analyses of the social, political and economic institutions of society. As a result,

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clearly enunciated doctrine has been evolved on such vital issues as national and colonial questions, religion, the role of women, agriculture and the peasantry, relations between Communist and non-Communist groups, etc. This doctrine is a source of both strength and weakness of the Communist movement; strong in that it has managed to capture the emotional and ideological adherence of millions of devoted partisans who feel that it provides a solution to the ills of the world; weak in that it commits the movement to adherence to concepts which by virtue of their inflexible character may lead to schisms, setbacks, reversals and defeat. The study of doctrine and its evolution is vital to successfully combating International Communism in the field of ideas, to chart the course of the movement itself, to recognize the possible rifts and divergencies, and to anticipate its major strategic moves.

(2) Organization - The International Communist movement has developed a number of organizations through which it seeks to extend its influence and achieve power. These organizations comprise a highly developed and systematized machinery for coordinating the multifarious activities of international Communism. This includes central bodies such as the Cominform which plans strategy, issues instructions and directives, provides mechanisms for handling financial matters, intelligence exchange and relations between parties. They number such bodies as the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Congress of Intellectuals for Defense of Peace, women's and students' organizations, etc.

These organizations must be made the subject of detailed and systematic intelligence research and the relations between the Communist parties explored to reveal the operational framework and to expose the vulnerable contact points. In addition, the direct connections of the Communist network with the Soviet Union and its diplomatic services must be carefully charted since they may reveal the objectives and policies of the Soviet Union in its search for world power.

(3) Strategy - A continuing analysis of the strategy being followed by the International Communist movement is vital to the security of the United States, because it is at this level that the most effective counter-activities must be correctly directed. Communist objectives and policies such as the weakening of the industrial potential of Western Europe, the retarding of economic recovery of capitalist nations, the promotion of colonial revolt, etc., must be closely observed. In addition, specific problems arising in connection with matters such as atomic energy, the Palestine situation, Trieste, etc., must be examined to reveal their connections with the overall strategic decisions and requirements since they may provide valuable clues to the Soviet Union's plans and policies as well as to the possibility of divergences existing between Moscow and local Communists.

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(4) Operational Methods - The tactical means employed by the International Communist movement are a further field for intelligence operations. The intelligence agencies should provide the data necessary for the comprehension of Communist methods of parliamentary or revolutionary character, Communist agitation and propaganda, Communist infiltration and utilization of "front" organizations, etc. These activities have become highly specialized and formalized in the development of the Communist movement. As such they may permit the detection of a complete operation to be embarked on in connection with changes in line, at an early stage.

(5) Personalities - The highly centralized character of the Communist movement has led to a corresponding stress on the role of leadership. The Communist leaders achieve their positions following a highly selective process of training and experience. Individuals become a part of the apparatus to fulfill specialized functions and to develop particular policies. Study of the selection, replacement, demotion and movements of the leadership often provides an index to the operations being conducted by the Communists. The intelligence agencies must have a developed system and organization of materials relating to this important aspect of International Communist functioning.

(6) Capabilities - The emergence of the Soviet Union as a major world power in conjunction with the forces of the International Communist movement directly affects the well-being and security of the United States. The ability of the regional and local organizations of the world Communist movement to hinder and obstruct the United States in its conduct of international affairs is a matter of direct and primary concern. American policy makers must have, against the background of Communist short term plans and long term objectives, a detailed evaluation of Communist capabilities to seize power in strategic areas, to deny the United States access to world areas, and to render aid to the Soviet Union.

(7) Vulnerabilities - Despite its persuasive ideology, its highly disciplined personnel and its carefully developed organization, International Communism is almost continuously beset by differences of interpretation on matters of doctrine, by rivalries among key personnel and by embarrassing discrepancies between theory and practice. Furthermore, the international "party line" often runs counter to the line which, for local reasons, various national parties are sometimes forced to pursue. For the very reason that Communist doctrine and discipline are so rigid, these contradictions are particularly troublesome and embarrassing, and thus offer a potentially fertile field for exploitation by the democratic nations through diplomacy, propaganda and psychological warfare. Such exploitation, however, calls for intelligence support considerably beyond the present capabilities of any U. S. agency.

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B - National Aspects of Communism

The present program of the United States intelligence agencies relating to the regional and national Communist parties must be identified and systematized. The research done on a country basis must be synchronized with the intelligence program dealing with the international aspects of Communism. The same general features of the world Communist movement deserve consideration on the national level, i.e., doctrine, organization, strategy, operational methods, personalities, and capabilities. In every country or region of significance to the United States policy, where a Communist movement exists, careful attention to these factors are a requirement of adequate intelligence coverage, with special emphasis as indicated.

(1) Doctrine - The specific application of Communist doctrine to the national scene must be studied and evaluated in the light of possible deviations from established patterns. The national Communist movements afford many instances in which differences of a theoretical nature have resulted in schism and a subsequent decline in influence and organization, i.e., the requirements of Soviet policy towards the major powers has provided the grounds for doctrinal dispute in the colonial areas over the principle of colonial independence.

(2) Organization - A continuing survey of the organizations of each party should be undertaken to provide detailed and current knowledge of (a) national bodies such as national congresses, the central executive committee, the Politburo, the political secretariat, the control and auditing commissions, personnel assigned to direct and control front organizations and special systems including party training schools, party communications, and illegal apparatus; (b) regional level organizations, their respective jurisdictions and methods of operation; (c) the local level organization.

(3) Strategy - The goals and tasks set forth for the national Communist movement within the framework of international Communist strategy and the requirements of Soviet foreign policy must be established. The specific objectives of a political, economic or military nature prescribed for the national party must also be sought out as an index to the importance of the area to the Communist planners as well as an indication of the strength of the organizations involved.

(4) Operational Methods - Close attention to the tactics of the local Communist movements must be made with an eye to determining and anticipating possible changes in the world Communist line, by noting new departures in activity.

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(5) Personalities - The leadership of the local parties must be assessed and evaluated in terms of their devotion to the international movement and their subservience to Soviet policy. The possible emergence of "nationalistically" inclined leadership in the Communist parties must be constantly sought after.

(6) Capabilities - Specific estimates of the ability of the local Communist parties to affect the internal life of the country in which they operate must be prepared with particular emphasis on ability to seize power, lower the military and economic potential, and sabotage the defense efforts.

(7) Vulnerabilities - National Communist groups, like the international organization, are subject to numerous internal conflicts and contradictions. These may spring from the personal rivalries of individual leaders, from the conflicting interests of particular groups (such as rural and urban) or from the fact that the officially dictated "line" sometimes runs head on into deep-seated local traditions, prejudices and aspirations. The effective exploitation of these potential weaknesses calls for considerably improved intelligence coverage by U. S. agencies.

**Part 2 - PRESENT COVERAGE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM BY UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES**

In the past, intelligence coverage of Communist activities had suffered severely from the lack of any clear delineation of responsibility as between the various agencies. Each agency has been forced to give some attention to the subject, and especially those aspects of it which have had a direct bearing on the primary interests of the agency. However, there has been no comprehensive analysis of all relevant material at any one place within the Government, nor have any of the intelligence research agencies been able to render extensive service to other agencies, since the facilities of each are taxed to the limit in meeting the requirements of their own departments. The result has been extensive duplication in superficial coverage, but nowhere has the coverage been sufficiently comprehensive to meet the needs of national, as opposed to departmental intelligence requirements.

The Committee has attempted a general review of the scope and quality of studies on Communism which have been prepared by the various agencies since the war. While the number of such studies has been substantial, the great majority have been concerned with current and local questions. Many have been in response to specific requests, and most of the remainder have been focused on a specific development or a particular Communist capability in a certain country or area. Very few have been sufficiently comprehensive or definitive to meet the needs of national intelligence.

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After a general review of the production of the various agencies covering Communism in all areas, the Committee proceeded to select one area for a more detailed study. The Near East was agreed upon as a suitable sample for this purpose, and Near Eastern specialists from the various agencies were invited to participate. From the discussions which followed, it appeared that the Near Eastern experts from the research agencies, especially CIR and ORE, were of the opinion that the material which they were presently receiving was not adequate in quality to support any comprehensive estimate of Communist capabilities in that area. This phase of the discussion pointed to the conclusion that, certainly with regard to the Near East, and probably in other areas as well, present field collection is not adequate for the needs of U. S. security. The necessary improvement can not be achieved, however, until the research agencies are in a better position to furnish the collection agencies with more detailed guidance as to their requirements and more authoritative evaluations of raw reports.

A further problem results from the present confusion in the processing and filing of incoming material. In some agencies reports on local Communist activities are processed and filed by the appropriate regional branches, while reports on international aspects of Communism are handled by the branch covering the USSR. In others, international Communism and those Communist activities which present security problems are handled by functional branches or groups. This results in extensive duplication in some cases, and in inadequate coverage in others. A researcher seeking all of the material on a certain Communist problem might have to explore the files of a dozen different branches throughout the various agencies. Furthermore, he could not rely on the research agencies alone, since considerable valuable material apparently is held by the security agencies.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Committee has agreed to the conclusions and recommendations set forth in parts II and III of this interim report.

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**PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE TREATMENT OF**  
**INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM BY CIA**

**I. Assumptions:**

1. That international Communism constitutes a primary, current, and long-range threat to US national security.
2. That the aims and objectives of international Communism are to a large degree indistinguishable from those of the USSR.
3. That US policy and operational agencies require a greater volume of better intelligence than has been produced on this subject in order to wage effective political, economic, psychological and other kinds of warfare against the USSR and the international Communist movement.
4. That adequate intelligence treatment of international Communism requires coverage of the subject on a threefold basis: namely, (a) from the viewpoint of the USSR, (b) as it relates to the individual country concerned, and (c) its total international effect on US security.
5. That a full scale analysis of the organization, doctrine, functions and methods of operations, personalities, objectives and capabilities of the international Communist movement on a continuing basis, country by country, and world-wide, is essential to US security. It is not sufficient from an intelligence viewpoint merely to "Cover" trends and developments as they emerge.

**II. Organizational Plan**

1. The proposed plan provides for three elements to be established within ORE for the intelligence treatment of international Communism as follows:
  - a. The ORE Intelligence Production Board, under the chairmanship of the Assistant Director, ORE, and augmented by selected experts in the study of the Communist movement will give overall guidance and direction to the production effort, and will review and approve drafts of reports produced prior to publication.
  - b. The International Communism Group, EE/USSR Branch, under the operational direction of the Chief, EE/USSR Branch, will have primary production responsibilities for intelligence coverage of international Communism on a world-wide basis.

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III. Mission

1. Under the overall guidance of the IPB, (augmented) the operational direction of the Chief, EE/USSR Branch, and in collaboration with the other ORE producing components, the International Communist Group, EE/USSR Branch will produce national intelligence on international Communism which will:
  - a. analyze the doctrine, organization, techniques, personalities, and activities of the international Communist movement as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy and as a threat to US security.
  - b. determine its immediate and long-range aims and objectives in all areas, individually on a country by country basis, and collectively on a world-wide basis.
  - c. appraise its capabilities in meeting such objectives, interpret the significance of its activities in terms of US security and forecast and interpret its probable future activities and their consequences.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the IAC

SUBJECT : Delineation of Responsibility for Research into  
the International Communist Movement

1. An inter-departmental Ad Hoc Committee studying Communism, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of the EE/USSR Branch of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the CIA has reported that the planning of a coordinated program for research into the international Communist movement cannot proceed until there is a definitive delineation of responsibility for such research among the various intelligence research organizations.

2. The provisions of NSCID/3 are not intended to be sufficiently explicit to permit a clear-cut division of effort on the Communist movement at the working level. Accordingly, a meeting of the Standing Committee of the IAC agencies will be called to determine what specific aspects of the Communist movement should be covered by each Department. Since the inter-departmental Ad Hoc Committee has already examined the problems of research into the international Communist movement at some length, it would appear advisable to include its members in joint session with the Standing Committee for the purpose of drafting an appropriate delineation of responsibilities for processing by the IAC.

3. The Standing Committee will convene in joint session with the [redacted] on February 1949.

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Please return  
2505 "M" st.  
signed.

The Honorable  
J. Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

To [unclear]  
Remittance  
suggested by [unclear]

The Central Intelligence Agency is establishing an advisory board under the Chairmanship of Mr. Theodore Babbitt, Assistant Director of the Agency, which will guide a special program of intelligence research into the international Communist movement. The board will include a number of this Agency's leading experts in the study of Communist activity in all foreign areas throughout the world.

In order to achieve complete coordination of effort on the Communist movement, I should like to invite the Federal Bureau of Investigation to designate a representative to sit on the advisory board. In view of the experience and training of your staff in the study of Communist activities in the areas under your investigative jurisdiction, I believe that participation of a representative of your bureau would be beneficial to a total US intelligence effort in this field.

Sincerely yours,

ORE/SPP/MAT/jb

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